There are two broad technical
approaches to market forecasting: metrics characterizing some feature of the
market’s breadth and metrics assessing market psychology or, as more commonly
known, the market’s sentiment. Over the past year and a half, I’ve been
developing approaches to both.
In the past couple of months,
I’ve described the "amazing 200,"
a new measure of market breadth that can be used to identify bullish and bearish market temperaments,
i.e., to identify times when one can enter the market swimming with the current
versus times when one’s forced to swim against it. Essentially, this metric
tracks a construct of the number of liquid stocks trading below their respective
200-day moving averages. It provides a measure of what’s happening to the
breadth of the market, usually in alternating, longer-term trends of more than
90 days.
In addition to following
what’s happening to the breadth of the market, however, it pays to know how
traders currently feel about the state of the market, since most, selling out of
fear and buying out of greed, do so at exactly the wrong times, i.e., the first
at the market’s low and the second at the its high. In this report, I’ll detail
an approach designed to categorize such market sentiment. The approach utilizes
two well know measures of market sentiment: the CBOE equity Put/Call ratio and
the OEX volatility index (VXO, formerly VIX).
The underlying premise for
both measures has been that exceptionally high or low readings reflect emotional
extremes among traders, and, thus, should correlate to bottoms and tops in the
market. Basically, the put/call ratio is a simple ratio of the total number of
puts that have been traded that day at the CBOE divided by the total number of
calls traded. When the market is falling, traders buy puts; hence, the ratio
increases. Conversely, when the market is rising, traders buy calls, and the
ratio falls. When this ratio becomes extreme (and the definition of extreme has
changed over time), it usually marks a reversal in the course of the market.
High values of the ratio, for example, are bullish in a contrarian sort of way.
The VXO, also compiled by the
CBOE, is the implied volatility of the S&P 100 (OEX) options. Essentially,
implied volatility is the market's current estimate of its future volatility,
i.e., it’s reflective of where the smart money thinks the OEX will trade over
the immediate future. It correlates directly with option premium. During
market declines, volatility rises because traders hedge their positions with
puts, and put sellers demand more for their perceived increased risk.
Conversely, at lower levels of risk, complacency sets in and OEX option premium
(and its implied volatility) falls. Again, extreme values have historically
marked reversal points in the market.
The underlying premise of
both these measures is that extremely high or low readings reflect emotional
extremes among investors, and, thus, correlate to bottoms and tops in the
overall market. High implied volatility and a high number of puts traded
reflect pessimistic sentiment (fear) that marks bottoms, and low volatility with
a preference for calls reflects a bullish sentiment (greed) that marks tops.
Sentiment work to date has, for
the most part, utilized these measures to identify and then take advantage of
short-term overbought or oversold conditions: see Larry Connor’s article,
“The Battle Plan Returns,” which develops a successful short-term trading
strategy based on the VIX, and David Burkey’s article, “Tracking VIX Swings,” in
the Jan ’06 Active Trader, which details market behavior following 10-,
20-, 40-, 60- and 120-day lows and highs in the VIX. Unlike theirs, which
utilizes spikes in sentiment, my approach has been to take advantage of its changing
trends. Here, I'll present a measure (I call "Sentiment Product") that makes use
of the changing trend in sentiment.
Jay Kaepple described a
profitable strategy utilizing sentiment trend. In an article published in the
August 2004, issue of Active Trader entitled “The Put/Call VXO.”
Jay described a sentiment indicator constructed from the two common measures of
sentiment. Essentially, for both indicators, one takes 10-day and 65-day moving
averages, divides the first by the second to normalize the data, and then uses
the simple average of both of these ratios to trigger entry and exit points for
the market. Contrasting a short-term moving average against a longer-term one
in the construct of their ratio, not only normalizes data of widely different
magnitudes, but also picks up changes in trend.
He recommended buying the S&P
500 when this average ratio fell below 1.10 after previously rising to 1.10 or
above and selling when it rose above 0.90 after falling to 0.90 or below. In 13
trades over a six-year period (12 profitable) between 1997 and 2003, his
approach generated a +148% return.
I’ve tweaked Jay’s approach by
taking the product of the two measures rather than their average. For this
product to form a maximum, the two measures must be in phase with one another,
reinforce one another if you will, and this added requirement ensures the
changing trends in sentiment are accentuated, hence, more accurately detected.

Chart I shows how the sentiment
product (blue line) moves inversely to the S&P 500 (red line) over the 480
trading days between 1/23/04 and 12/2305. As the sentiment product rose, fear
began to dominate the market as it fell. Conversely, when the sentiment product
peaked and began to fall, complacency dominated the market when sentiment
reached an extreme.
Chart II, a plot of the change
in the S&P versus the change in the sentiment product, shows that falling
sentiment (negative values) leads to positive S&P returns (green bubbles whose
size reflects the length of the run), and conversely, rising sentiment (positive
values) leads to negative S&P returns (red bubbles). Note: The encircled
numbers indicate the length on the run in days.

Over this period, there were 12
positive runs (235 days in total), ranging from 9 to 39 days, interspersed with 13 negative runs (242 days
in total), ranging from 6 to 45 days. The
first generated +462.5 S&P 500 points (+40.6%), while the second dropped –247.7 S&P
500 points (-21.3%). Compare that to the 127.1 points (+11.1%) earned by just
entering the S&P 500 and staying put. Clearly, there is an advantage to utilizing
the Sentiment Product to define prevailing market trends, market
health if you will.
One can use the sentiment
product in at least two ways: (1) to define times favorable for trading stocks
long versus times favorable for trading stocks short (or staying out of the
market all together) and (2) as a trigger to shift between S&P funds and bond
funds available within a 401K plan. One could even double the impact by using
the sentiment product to trigger entry/exit points using two Rydex funds:
Tempest (RYTPX) constructed to move 200% inversely to the S&P versus Titan (RYTNX)
constructed to move 200% with the S&P. In a future article, I’ll deal with the
combination of the sentiment product (market sentiment) and the “amazing 200”
(market breadth): the first defining shorter-term trends in the second.
|
Market Falling |
Market Rising |
|
Begin |
End |
Trading Days |
Rising Sentiment Product Change |
Change in S&P 500 |
Begin |
End |
Trading Days |
Falling Sentiment Product Change |
Change in S&P 500 |
|
1/23/04 |
2/6/04 |
11 |
0.21 |
1.21 |
2/9/04 |
2/20/04 |
9 |
-0.06 |
4.3 |
|
2/23/04 |
3/19/04 |
20 |
0.62 |
-31.21 |
3/22/05 |
4/27/04 |
26 |
-0.78 |
42.71 |
|
4/28/04 |
5/17/04 |
14 |
0.5 |
-38.31 |
5/18/04 |
6/29/04 |
29 |
-0.69 |
44.71 |
|
6/30/04 |
7/15/04 |
11 |
0.27 |
-34.15 |
7/16/04 |
7/30/04 |
11 |
-0.27 |
0.38 |
|
8/2/04 |
8/17/04 |
12 |
0.44 |
-24.91 |
8/18/04 |
9/20/04 |
23 |
-0.45 |
27.03 |
|
9/21/04 |
10/20/04 |
22 |
0.3 |
-25.64 |
10/21/04 |
11/18/04 |
21 |
-0.42 |
77.06 |
|
11/19/04 |
12/8/04 |
13 |
0.12 |
12.47 |
12/9/04 |
12/23/04 |
11 |
-0.15 |
20.89 |
|
12/27/04 |
1/20/05 |
18 |
0.31 |
-29.51 |
1/21/05 |
2/8/05 |
13 |
-0.25 |
34.43 |
|
2/9/05 |
3/21/05 |
28 |
0.3 |
-8.21 |
3/22/05 |
4/7/05 |
12 |
-0.12 |
19.43 |
|
4/8/05 |
4/27/05 |
14 |
0.23 |
-24.82 |
4/28/05 |
6/22/05 |
39 |
-0.57 |
70.66 |
|
6/23/05 |
8/25/05 |
45 |
0.44 |
11.64 |
8/26/05 |
9/12/05 |
11 |
-0.14 |
35.46 |
|
9/13/05 |
10/20/05 |
28 |
0.4 |
-53.4 |
10/21/05 |
12/2/05 |
30 |
-0.72 |
85.49 |
|
12/5/05 |
12/12/05 |
6 |
0.08 |
-1.66 |
12/13/05 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
242 Trading Days |
|
-244.84 S&P 500 Points |
|
|
235 Trading Days |
|
+462.5 S&P 500 Points |